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THE BURGER COURT
The retirement of Chief Justice Burger has prompted the media and
legal scholars to look back on the 17 years he served as Chief, and to make
comparisons with the years of Earl Warren's tenure as Chief Justice. I have
served for 14 1/2 of the Burger Court years. Perhaps my view of the two
Courts may be of interest. In a luncheon talk, of course, I can do little
more than generalize and cite to a few of the leading cases.
When describing judicial decisions, I do not like to use the political
labels "liberal" and "conservative." Apart from the fact that a judge may
take what is considered a liberal position on some areas of the law and a
conservative one on others, I believe that most judges-Federal and State-
try conscientiously to obey their oath of office, and to put behind them
partisan and social predilections. But it is a common practice for Presidents
to make their judicial appointments based on their perception of the
appointees' political views. This practice was followed by the Presidents
who appointed members of the Burger Court.
President Nixon, sensing substantial public displeasure with Warren
Court decisions on criminal procedure, announced his intention to appoint
conservatives. This also was a goal of Presidents Ford and Reagan. These
three Republican Presidents appointed six members of the Court over which
Warren Burger presided. But it is clear from the history of the Court, and
certainly that of both the Warren and Burger Courts, that Presidents
frequently are disappointed in the performance of their appointees. However
one defines the term "conservative," there has been no conservative coun-
terrevolution by the Burger Court.
Criminal Procedure
Perhaps the highest expectation of the Presidents who appointed the
Burger Court majority was that their appointees would vote to overrule the
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criminal procedure decisions of the Warren Court. The names of many of
those decisions are well known, among them Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961), Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), and, of course,
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
These Were the doctrinal pillars of the Warren Court's criminal proce-
dure jurisprudence. The Burger Court overruled none of these decisions.
Indeed, in recent years Miranda has become a household term, though
members of the public probably use it with less than full understanding.
Perhaps you have heard the story of the woman whose son was a
professor of law and who occasionally commented to him about the law.
After Ernesto Miranda was killed in a barroom brawl over a card game,
the mother sent her son a copy of the newspaper clipping concerning
Miranda's death. On the bottom she wrote: "Charles, after all he did for
us, isn't this a shame!" Whatever one's view of Miranda, the decision has
a symbolic quality that extends far beyond its practical impact upon police
interrogation methods.
It is fair to say that some decisions of the Burger Court have limited
Miranda. In Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), for example, in an
opinion by Chief Justice Burger, the Court held that statements inadmissible
in the prosecution's case-in-chief because of defective Miranda warnings
nevertheless could be used to impeach the defendant's credibility if he chose
to take the stand.
More recently, in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984), the Court
recognized a narrow public safety exception to the Miranda rule. In that
case, officers arrested a suspect in a crowded supermarket. When an officer
noticed that the suspect wore an empty shoulder holster, he asked the
suspect, without first giving Miranda warnings, where he had hidden the
gun. We held that the suspect's response and the gun were admissible in
evidence because the need to protect the public safety outweighed the need
for Miranda warnings.
The Burger Court also was called upon to define the terms used in the
Miranda standard and thus to clarify the extent of the protections the
decision afforded. In Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), for
example, the Court defined the meaning of "interrogation" for purposes
of Miranda, holding that warnings are required "whenever a person in
custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equiva-
lent." Id. at 300-01. While that legal definition appears fairly generous, the
Court went on to apply it cautiously, concluding that the respondent in
Innis had not been "interrogated." Similarly, the Burger Court provided a
test for deciding when a suspect is "in custody" for Miranda purposes.
See, e.g., Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (per curiam).
In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), the Burger Court expanded
the protections afforded by Miranda. Under the Edwards rule, whenever a
suspect invokes his Fifth Amendment right to have counsel present during
custodial interrogation, the police are not free to resume questioning until
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counsel has been made available, unless the suspect himself initiates further
conversations with the police.'
An important Sixth Amendment decision of the Warren Court was
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). Massiah held that, once a
suspect's Sixth Amendment rights attach, police may not deliberately elicit
incriminating statements from him in the absence of his lawyer. This decision
had enormous practical implications for police investigation techniques. The
Burger Court repeatedly has reaffirmed Massiah, making clear that the rule
applies to surreptitious interrogation methods. See Brewer v. Williams, 430
U.S. 387 (1977); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980); Maine v.
Moulton, 474 U.S. - (1985). In Kuhlmann v. Wilson, - U.S. - (1986),
however, the Court did place an outer limit on the Massiah rule, requiring
a defendant to show that the police took some action, beyond merely listen-
ing, to elicit his incriminating remarks.
The Warren Court also is well known for its Fourth Amendment
decisions. One of the most famous of these, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961), held that the exclusionary rule was applicable in state criminal trials.
The Burger Court has continued stringently to enforce the rights of indi-
viduals to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. But we have
qualified some of the Warren Court's broad statements concerning the scope
of the remedy for violation of Fourth Amendment rights.
Most importantly perhaps, the Burger Court rejected language in Mapp
that suggested the use of illegally seized evidence was itself a Fourth
Amendment violation. We explained that the exclusionary rule was a "ju-
dicially created means of effectuating" Fourth Amendment rights that rested
"principally on the belief that exclusion would deter future unlawful police
conduct." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482, 484 (1976). Based on that
view of the exclusionary rule, the Burger Court significantly modified the
rule when, in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), we adopted the
so-called "good faith" exception.
The Burger Court inherited criminal procedure decisions announcing
broad principles protecting the rights of criminal defendants. 2 In reviewing
1. Just this term, the Court extended the rule in Edwards, holding that its protection
applies once a suspect invokes his Sixth Amendment right to counsel during his arraignment.
Michigan v. Jackson, - U.S. - (1986).
2. Capital punishment jurisprudence was one area that was virtually undeveloped by
the Warren Court, with that Court implicitly accepting the view that imposition of the death
penalty was consistent with the Constitution. Indeed, in an opinion written for himself and
three other Justices, Chief Justice Warren expressed the view that the death penalty could not
"be said to violate the constitutional concept of cruelty" because the penalty had been
employed throughout our Nation's history and was still accepted by our society. Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958). In 1972, however, the Burger Court took the significant step
of deciding that capital punishment, as then implemented by the States, offended the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972). When States responded to Furman by reenacting their death penalty statutes, the
Court concluded that imposition of capital punishment for the crime of murder was not a per
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lower court decisions applying those principles, the Court was repeatedly
called upon to define their terms and to clarify their scope. I think it is
fair to say that the record of the Burger Court in this area reflects a higher
sensitivity to the public interest in law enforcement than that reflected in
some of the decisions of the Warren Court. But in my view, we have not
diminished the constitutional protections afforded to those suspected of
committing crime. 3
Racial Discrimination
I move now to racial discrimination decisions. The differences, if any,
between the Warren and Burger Courts in this area resulted from the nature
of the issues presented to the two Courts. The great legacy of Earl Warren's
Court was Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Brown was
followed by Green v. School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430
(1968), which held that federal courts could, in appropriate cases, order
affirmative action to achieve desegregated public schools.
The Burger Court has not retreated from these decisions. Indeed, in
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971), a
unanimous Burger Court ruled that federal district courts had remedial
authority to order busing of school children where desegregation otherwise
could not be achieved. Brown, Green, and Swann involved de jure segre-
gation. Two years after Swann, we extended the principles recognized in
the de jure context to a case involving de facto segregation in the Denver,
se violation of the Eighth Amendment and upheld those statutes that provided safeguards
against arbitrary and capricious imposition of the penalty by guiding sentencing discretion.
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffit v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). In recent years, we have considered many challenges to
imposition of the death penalty, seeking to ensure that the penalty is administered both
consistently and fairly. E.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985); Enmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 782 (1982); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S.
430 (1980). The Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that imposition of the penalty is constitutional
only if States scrupulously follow standards that protect against its arbitrary imposition. In
two important capital punishment cases decided this term, we concluded that the Eighth
Amendment bars execution of a prisoner who is insane, Ford v. Wainwright, - U.S. -
(1986), but upheld the States' practice of excluding from the jury that will decide guilt persons
with scruples against the death penalty, Lockhart v. McCree, __ U.S. - (1986).
3. Habeas corpus jurisprudence is another area in which the Burger Court inherited a
legacy of broad decisions favoring the rights of criminal defendants. The Burger Court clearly
has narrowed some of those decisions. Fairly read, the Burger Court's decisions represent an
effort to accommodate the States' interest in finality of criminal convictions, on which many
important aspects of a rational criminal justice system are founded, with a prisoner's interest
in relief from unjust incarceration. For example, in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), we
removed Fourth Amendment claims from the reach of the federal habeas statutes because of
the costs imposed on the administration of criminal justice by application of the exclusionary
rule on collateral review. We concluded that federal courts no longer should accept habeas
jurisdiction over search and seizure claims unless the prisoner could show that the State had
denied him a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim. In Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S.
72 (1977), the Burger Court disapproved the "sweeping language" used by the Warren Court
in Fay v. Nola, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), concerning the availability of federal habeas corpus to
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Colorado school system. Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado,
413 U.S. 189 (1973).
Perhaps the most difficult issues in this area arise in "affirmative
action" or "reverse discrimination" cases. The Warren Court never con-
fronted this issue. We squarely faced it for the first time in Regents of
University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). There, the Univer-
sity's system for admission to its Medical School used a quota, reserving
16 of 100 seats for minority students. The parties conceded that the
respondent Bakke, whose application for admission was rejected, had better
grades and test scores than most of the minority students admitted. Since
diversity of experience and background, including race, was desirable in the
educational setting, we concluded that a university lawfully could consider
race as a factor in its admissions system. But we disapproved fixed quotas
based on race alone such as that used by the University in Bakke.
Two years after Bakke, we considered an affirmative action program,
expressly approved by Congress, for choosing contractors for Federal work
projects. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). We upheld the plan,
although there was no Court for the appropriate standard to be used to
assess the constitutionality of affirmative action.
This past term, we decided three difficult affirmative action cases. The first,
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, - U.S. _ (1986), was brought by
nonminority teachers to challenge their school board's layoff system, under
which nonminority teachers would be discharged while minority teachers
with less seniority would be retained. The board sought to justify the system
on the ground that it alleviated the effects of societal discrimination by
providing role models for minority students. But there had been no finding
of prior employment discrimination on the part of the school board. We
therefore concluded that the racial classification embodied in the layoff
provision violated equal protection.
In two cases involving discrimination by local unions, we considered
whether Title VII empowers federal courts to order race-conscious relief
that benefits persons who were not actual victims of discrimination. Sheet
Metal Workers v. EEOC, - U.S. __ (1986); Firefighters v. Cleveland,
- U.S. - (1986). We concluded that such remedies, including hiring goals,
may be appropriate where an employer or a labor union "has engaged in persistent
or egregious discrimination," or where "necessary to dissipate the lingering ef-
fects of pervasive discrimination." Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, supra at__
Despite the careful consideration given these cases, we have not yet
agreed on a standard generally applicable in affirmative action cases. It is
review a state prisoner's constitutional claim that the state courts had refused to consider on
the merits because of noncompliance with a contemporaneous objection rule. Sykes rejected
the "deliberate bypass" standard of Fay v. Noia in favor of a test requiring the prisoner to
demonstrate "cause and prejudice." This term, we were asked to reconsider Sanders v. United
States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963), another broad Warren Court decision concerning habeas corpus. In
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, - U.S. - (1986), a plurality of the Court agreed that a state prisoner
is not entitled to successive federal habeas corpus review of his conviction unless he supplements
his constitutional claim with a showing of factual innocence.
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difficult to identify such a standard because these cases present a wide
variety of circumstances, and raise issues under both the Equal Protection
Clause and civil rights statutes. It is to be hoped that the day will soon
come when race and ancestry are factors no longer taken into account in
either private or governmental decision-making.
I mention one additional race discrimination case decided this term. In
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), the Warren Court effectively
permitted prosecutors to use peremptory challenges to strike prospective
black jurors on account of their race. This term, in Batson v. Kentucky,
__ U.S. __ (1986), we overruled Swain and held that such a use of peremp-
tory challenges violates a black defendant's right to equal protection. Now,
where the prosecutor's action in striking blacks gives rise to an inference
of discrimination, he must articulate a valid, nondiscriminatory reason for
his use of peremptory challenges. In this case, the Burger Court went well
beyond the Warren Court in expanding protections afforded to minorities
in a criminal trial.
Sex Discrimination
Although it had few opportunities to consider the issue, the Warren
Court seemed almost uninterested in sex discrimination. For a century, the
Supreme Court had refused to overturn the line that States traditionally
drew between the sexes, upholding statutes barring women from jury service
and from certain occupations. In Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961), the
Warren Court reaffirmed that States largely were free to exclude women
from jury service.
By contrast, the Burger Court repeatedly has removed barriers to
equality among the sexes. While there have been many important decisions
in this area, I mention only a few.
The earliest was Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), that invalidated,
under the Equal Protection Clause, an Idaho statute that gave a mandatory
preference to male applicants for letters of administration of a decedent's
estate. Although Chief Justice Burger's opinion for a unanimous Court was
brief, it was recognized as a turning point in our equal protection juris-
prudence.
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), marked the beginning of
the Burger Court's efforts to decide what level of equal protection scrutiny
should be applied to legislative classifications based on sex. A plurality
argued that such classifications should be held inherently suspect and subject
to strict judicial scrutiny. Four other Justices concurred in the judgment,
declining to adopt that view of the applicable standard. But eight members
of the Court agreed that the Equal Protection Clause required that married
women in the armed services be provided fringe benefits identical to those
given to married men.
The Burger Court also effectively overruled the Warren Court's holding
that a state lawfully could exclude women from jury service. Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), invalidated a Louisiana statute, similar to
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that upheld by the Warren Court in Hoyt v. Florida, that excluded all
women from jury service except those who volunteered. Taylor was premised
on the Sixth Amendment's requirement that juries in criminal trials be
drawn from a fair cross-section of the community, rather than on the Equal
Protection Clause. But language in Justice White's opinion for the Court
rejected the notion that "all women should be exempt from jury service
based solely on their sex and [their] presumed role in the home." 419 U.S.
at 535 n.17.
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982),
presented a reverse sex discrimination situation. In an opinion by Justice
O'Connor, the Court held that a state-supported professional nursing school
could not lawfully exclude men even though seven other state universities
were coeducational, with two of those seven schools providing the very
curriculum that the respondent sought to pursue. This decision took the
important step of clearly articulating a standard applicable to gender-based
classifications. The Court held that a government attempting to support
such a classification has the heavy "burden of showing an 'exceedingly
persuasive justification' for the classification," that is satisfied by showing
that the "classification serves 'important governmental objectives and that
the discriminatory means employed' are 'substantially related to the achieve-
ment of those objectives.' "458 U.S. at 724 (citations omitted).4
Finally, in a case decided this term, we held that allegations of "hostile
environment" sexual harassment state an actionable sex discrimination claim
under Title VII. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, - U.S. - (1986). The
Court unanimously agreed on the result in this case.
Substantive Due Process
The most controversial decision of the Burger Court is Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973), that invalidated on substantive due process grounds
state laws that criminalized most abortions. Roe v. Wade and its progeny
recognize a right of privacy, "founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's
concept of personal liberty," that encompasses a woman's interest in ob-
taining an abortion. See, e.g., Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas
City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983). This right is not absolute,
but is subject to the States' interests in preserving maternal health or the
life of a viable fetus. Because of their emphasis on the liberty and privacy
4. Another line of equal protection cases decided by the Warren court involved challenges
by individual voters to their States' reapportionment statutes. E.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). The Burger Court repeatedly has reaffirmed
the vitality of the principles announced there. E.g., Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735
(1973). This term, the Court extended this line of decisions, squarely holding for the first time
that a claim of partisan political gerrymandering is justiciable under the Equal Protection
Clause. Davis v. Bandemer, - U.S. - (1986). But there was no Court for the standard
that should be used to assess the constitutionality of reapportionment law alleged to be an unlawful
partisan gerrymander.
19871
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
interests of women, these decisions have been viewed as rejecting a type of
sex discrimination. This term we reaffirmed Roe v. Wade in Thornburgh
v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, __ U.S. __ (1986).
A recent case tested the limits of substantive due process. In Bowers v.
Hardwick, __ U.S. __ (1986), the Court declined to hold that substantive
due process encompasses a right to engage in homosexual sodomy. Statutes
similar to the Georgia law challenged in this case have been on the books
for hundreds of years. These laws, now moribund and rarely enforced, still
exist in about half of the states. The case may not be as significant as press
reports suggest. The respondent had not been tried or convicted, and we
had no occasion to consider possible defenses, such as one based on the
Eighth Amendment, to an actual prosecution.
First Amendment
Although First Amendment partisans rarely seem satisfied, both the
Warren and Burger Courts have been sensitive to the First Amendment
rights that are fundamental to our democracy. Certainly, there has been no
retreat by the Burger Court from the stringent enforcement of these im-
portant rights.5
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, decided by the Warren
Court in 1964, conferred a broad cloak of immunity upon the press. The
Sullivan rule requires a public official to prove that defamatory statements
relating to his official conduct were made with "actual malice." The Warren
Court extended this rule to public figures in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130 (1967).
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), a libel suit brought
against a media defendant by a private individual, the Burger Court defined
the limits of the Sullivan rule. Gertz held that Sullivan does not apply in
5. Indeed, the Burger Court was the first to rule that the First Amendment affords
some protection to speech concerning a commercial transaction. Prior to the 1970's, the Court
declined to hold that the First Amendment placed any restraint on governmental regulation of
commercial speech. E.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). In a series of decisions
beginning with Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), the Burger Court held that commercial
speech is not wholly outside the protection of the First Amendment. See Virginia Pharmacy
Board v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433
U.S. 350 (1977). This term, in a case involving casino advertising, the Court again reaffirmed
that speech concerning commercial transactions is entitled to First Amendment protection.
Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co., - U.S. - (1986). But we concluded that
a State's interest in the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens could support a decision to regulate
commercial speech, as long as the restrictions advanced that interest and were no more extensive
than necessary to serve that interest.
The Burger Court also squarely rejected the view that the First Amendment protects only
speech by individuals. Rather, we have repeatedly reaffirmed the principle that speech by
corporations and other associations is entitled to First Amendment protection. See First National
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service
Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530 (1980); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n,
- U.S. - (1986).
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suits brought by private citizens seeking to recover actual damages for
defamatory falsehoods. While some critics regarded Gertz as a retreat from
Sullivan, the decision reflects the Court's continuing effort to accommodate
the States' interest in compensating for injury to reputation with First
Amendment freedoms.
Just this term, however, in a case involving a private plaintiff, the
Court struck the balance in favor of the press. In Philadelphia Newspapers,
Inc. v. Hepps, - U.S. - (1986), we reversed the common law presumption
that defamatory speech is false, and required a private plaintiff to prove falsity. 6
The Burger Court also has decided a number of cases presenting issues
under the "religion clauses" of the First Amendment. I believe it is fair to
say that no prior court has been more zealous to assure separation of
church and state, and at the same time to protect the rights guaranteed by
the Free Exercise Clause.7 Of course, our decisions in this area reflect the
tensions inevitably created by the sometimes conflicting values embodied in
the religion clauses.
Summary
The Burger Court decided well over 2,000 cases. The Warren Court,
over 15 years, decided several hundred fewer cases. I cite these numbers to
emphasize the high degree of selectivity in my discussion this afternoon.
Depending upon the cases one chooses, and one's purpose or bias, either
of these courts can be cast in liberal or conservative, favorable or unfavor-
able lights.
But some points seem indisputable. Perhaps to the disappointment of
the Presidents who nominated members of the Burger Court, there has been
no "counterrevolution" by that Court. None of the landmark decisions of
the Warren Court was overruled, and some were extended.
It has been fashionable for critics to say that the Burger Court "lacked
6. In another recent decision, we emphasized the important role of the federal courts
in safeguarding the precious freedoms of speech and press guaranteed by the First Amendment.
Under Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984), the Court
held that appellate judges must independently decide whether the evidence in the record
supports a trial court's finding of malice. We reaffirmed in Bose that "[t]he requirement of
independent appellate review reiterated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan is a rule of federal
constitutional law." 466 U.S. at 510.
7. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), a decision written by Chief Justice Burger
during the early years of the Burger Court, established the "purpose, effect, and entanglement"
test that remains the governing standard under the Establishment Clause. During the 1984
term, the Court applied that standard in three cases presenting challenges under the Establish-
ment Clause. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Grand Rapids School District v. Ball,
- U.S. - (1985); Aguilar v. Felton, - U.S. - (1985). Our decisions under the Free
Exercise Clause have reaffirmed the principle that the Clause absolutely prohibits governmental
regulation of religious beliefs and that it substantially protects lawful conduct founded on religious
belief. Where the government limits religious liberty, it must demonstrate that the limitation" 'is
essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest.' " Bob Jones University v. United
States, 461 U.S. 574, 603 (1983) (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982));
see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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a sense of direction," appeared to "drift," or lacked a coherent "policy." 8
To lawyers, and certainly to Article III judges, these observations should
make little sense. The great strength of the Supreme Court is that we have
no "policy" or purpose other than "faithfully and impartially" to discharge
our duties "agreeably to the Constitution and laws of the United States." 9
This is our sworn duty. As a New York Times editorial put it, "The ultimate
glory of this unique institution is that each member [appointed for life] is
master only of himself." New York Times, June 18, 1986.
It is well to remember that the provisions of the Bill of Rights are
expressed in general terms: the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth
Amendments all are open to, and indeed require, interpretation. Inevitably
and properly, reasonable minds-trained in the same law schools-often
differ in interpreting these important provisions. Yet, the long-term stability
of our legal system is based on the doctrine of stare decisis. Commentators
who expect radical changes because of personnel changes on the Court seem
to overlook our fidelity to this doctrine.
If I may speak personally, I knew most of the Justices on the Warren
Court, and of course I am close to those on the Burger Court with whom
I serve. I have great respect and admiration for the legal ability, devotion
to duty, and integrity of each of them.
Although at age 64 I went on the Court with some reluctance, I am
honored to serve on it. Under our remarkable constitutional system, the
Court has well discharged its responsibility to safeguard the liberties of our
people.
LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.
August 12, 1986
8. This misconception of the role of the Supreme Court was strikingly illustrated by a
widely circulated news story. The Court was criticized for giving "mixed signals" rather than
providing "one guided ideology." Richmond Times-Dispatch, July 13, 1986.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 453 (oath taken by federal Justices and judges).
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